Ⅰ. Background
In 2006, the Northwest Environmental Defense Center sued both Oregon State and various lumber companies for violating the Clean Water Act. While the defendants prevailed at trial, Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the NEDC upon appeal, holding that the defendants were required to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for two public roads running through the Tillamook State Forest that the defendant companies use to conduct logging operations. Precipitation washes sediment from these roads into streams and rivers, harming the wildlife that live there.
The CWA forbids the discharge of pollutants from a "point source" into navigable U.S. waters except in cases where the polluter has successfully applied for an NPDES permit under Section 402 of the Act. A point source is defined as a "any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 1) The Act specifically exempts agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture from the definition of point source. 2) In contrast, a "nonpoint source" describes pollution not traceable to one specific location or activity, but rather resulting from dispersed activities over large areas and thus difficult to regulate through individual permits. 3) In 1987 1) 33 USC Section 1362(14).
2) An "agricultural return flow" refers to artificially applied water that is not consumed by plants or evaporation, and that eventually "returns" to an aquifer or surface water body, such as a lake or stream.
amendments to the CWA specifically mandated NPDES permitting for five categories of significant stormwater point source pollution, including runoff associated with "industrial activity." 4) As the government authority chiefly responsible for administering the CWA, the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated the regulation known as the "Silvacultural Rule" in 1976. The EPA interpreted the CWA to mean that the only silvacultural activities for which polluters are required to obtain permits are those traceable to controlled water use by a person, in contrast to discharge from timber harvesting operations, surface drainage, or road construction and maintenance from which there is natural runoff. Therefore, per the EPA's longstanding interpretation of the Silvacultural Rule, only pollution arising from "rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities which are operated in connection with silvacultural activities" are point sources subject to the NPDES permit process. 5) After Congress amended the CWA in 1987, the EPA expanded its regulations to exempt all silvacultural activities except for the four previously defined under the Silvacultural Rule as point sources from being included under the definition of "industrial activity." 6) The Ninth Circuit rejected the EPA's and the defendants' interpretation of both the CWA and the Silvacultural Rule, finding the intent of Congress to be unambiguous when considered in light of the plain language of the statute as well
3) "The most common example of non-point source pollution is the residue left on roadways by automobiles. Small amount of rubber are worn off the tires of millions of cars and deposited as a thin film on highways; minute particles of copper dust from brake linings are spread acros roads... drips and drabs of oil and gas ubiquitosly stain drive-ways and streets. When it rains, the rubber particles and copper dust and gas and oil wash off of the streets and are carried along by runoff in a polluted soup, windiong up in creeks, rivers, bays, and the ocean. |90| 환경법과 정책 제9권 (2012.11.30) as the legislative history of the CWA. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the EPA's definition of industrial activity, holding that logging is an industrial activity as that term is used in the amended section of the Act. By its own rules, the EPA applies stormwater permitting requirements to "immediate access roads and rail lines used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured products, waste material, or by-products used or created by the facility. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .
|92| 환경법과 정책 제9권 (2012.11.30) The better argument on NEDC's behalf is that Section 1369(b) does not apply because the NEDC is seeking not to challenge any administrative action but rather to enforce EPA regulations where the EPA itself has failed to do so. In order to effectively evaluate NEDC's argument, the Ninth Circuit necessarily had to decide whether the CWA required the defendants to seek NPDES permits, and in order to answer that question the Ninth Circuit had to interpret the Silvacultural Rule itself. From the plain language of the Act, it seems quite clear that the CWA meant ditches and channels-such as those at the heart of the Stormwater Cases-to be considered point sources. 18) Furthermore, statements made during the deliberations leading up to the creation of the CWA make it quite clear that "if a man-made drainage, ditch, flushing system or other such device is involved and if measurable waste results and is discharged into water, it is considered a point source." 19) However, the issue in these cases may be more properly construed as whether or not under the CWA Congress intended to grant the EPA the power to define silvacultural sources as point or nonpoint. The EPA's interpretation of the CWA was not mandated by Congress but rather adopted based on the EPA's rulemaking authority under Section 501(a) of the CWA. 20) However, Congress did not manifest express intent not to allow the EPA to define silvacultural sources as it did, thus rendering the Act ambiguous with regard to this issue. 21 The National Governers' Association moreover argues that Chevron should apply based not on objective factors but rather that the courts should grant the EPA's construction of the CWA deference because the Silvacultural Rule limits the reach of the CWA and therefore prevents the Act from intruding into areas traditionally regulated by state and local governments. 25) The amici state that where an agency interprets an ambiguous statute as expanding federal jurisdiction, the Chevron doctrine should not be applied because it diverges from the principles of federalism, but where the agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute limits federal jurisdiction, Chevron deference should be applied because it converges with the principles of federalism. 26) To support this contention, the amici rely chiefly on 29) but in that case its analysis was unconcerned with the principles of federalism.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. US Army Corps of Engineers
The Clean Water Act was enacted with the dual goals of "restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters," and also to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution... [and] to plan the development... of land and water resources." 30) In creating the CWA, Congress clearly envisioned a partnership between federal, state, and local governments in controlling water pollution. 31) The petitioners' amici argue that because "Congress has authorized state and local governments to regulate nonpoint sources of pollution, there is no basis for the Ninth Circuit's concern that silvacultural stormwater runoff will be unregulated and the CWA's goals impaired unless such runoff is held to be a point source discharge subject to regulation under the NPDES. 32) However, just because Congress has granted the states authority to regulate stormwater runoff does not mean state governments will in reality be diligent about doing so.
The adequacy of state forestry guidelines and enforcement is widely variable.
Washington state has adopted a habitat conservation plan across 9.3 million acres and 60,000 miles of streams on forest lands within the states which expanded buffer zones around rivers, and created a new program to improve forest roads and culverts. In contrast, conservation measures in Oregon state are largely left up to the discretion of private landowners. States and rural counties that rely on timber revenue to fund public services will often look the other way when it comes to enforcement. 33) According to fishery scientist Chris Frissell, even when 11-338, 11-347, p. 9 (2012) . 32) Id. at p. 9-10. 33) Joshua Zaffos, "Oregon ignores logging road runoff, to the peril of native fish." High |96| 환경법과 정책 제9권 (2012.11.30) state-created guidelines are strict, they are often not enforced until projects are underway and it is too late to prevent harm. The federal NPDES review process mandates a more thorough review of polluter activity. 34) 3. Runoff from forest roads constitutes an "agricultural stormwater discharge" which is expressly exempted from the definition of point source discharge under the Clean Water Act
The petitioners and their amici have also argued that silvaculture is in reality just a type of agriculture, as it involves the harvest and processing of plants. From that argument it follows that the "agricultural stormwater discharge" point source exception also includes silvacultural stormwater discharges, and it would be strange for Congress to exempt agricultural activities from the definition of "point source"
but not do the same for silvacultural activities. 11-338, 11-347, p. 10 (2012) . 36) This is not to say that agriculture cannot involve raising trees as crops, but the issue in this case is silvaculture involving naturally occurring forests. 37) A study examining gully erosion from agricultural regions in the Pacific Northwest made the following findings:
[T]he sediment load directly from ephemeral gullies in the Potlatch subbasins is relatively small representing only 2.3 to 7.7 percent of the total surface sediment load. While these percentages may change somewhat due to climatic weather conditions (particularly rain-on-snow events), the average sediment yields from ephemeral gullies found in this particular watershed do not represent significant amounts of soil loss compared to the USDA tolerance value.
Where significant erosion of farmland does take place, it is usually due to wind rather than water. 38) Issues relating to agricultural pollution are focused on the contamination of runoff and groundwater due to the accumulation waste products and toxins such as nitrates and pesticides. 39) In the mountainous terrain where silvacultural operations most often take place, the effect of runoff from impervious road surfaces is "often insignificant compared with the conversion of slow moving groundwater to fast moving surface water at cutbanks by roads. Surface water is then carried by roadside ditches, some of which connect directly to streams while others drain to culverts with gullies incised below their outlets." 40) In other words, the most significant harm to the could be attributed to resulting road fill failures, and 74% of this erosion spilled into local streams. 42) Levels of suspended sediment in the waters of harvested areas were 10 times that of the level of unharvested areas within the same regio n. 43) In addition to the fundamental differences between agriculture and silvaculture, court analysis of the agricultural stormwater runoff exception explains why the wording of the exception cannot also be read to cover all stormwater discharges from forest roads. Although the term "agricultural" is not defined by the Clean Water Act and no court has ever ruled on the question of whether silvaculture is indeed equivalent in meaning to the term "agriculture" within the scope of the CWA, it is clear that courts do not consider all activities related to raising crops and livestock to be "agricultural. On rainy days, the manure was observed mixing with runoff and discharging through a pipe on the property into a local stream. While the court agreed that agricultural stormwater run-off has always been considered nonpoint source pollution exempt from the Clean Water Act, it defined the real issue as "not whether the discharges occurred during rainfall or were mixed with rain water run-off, but rather, whether the discharges were the result of precipitation. Of course, all discharges eventually mix with precipitation run-off in ditches or streams or navigable waters so the fact that the discharge might have been mixed with run-off cannot be determinative." 45) Rather, the runoff did not qualify as a nonpoint source of pollution because the jury had reason to believe that the run-off was "primarily caused by the over-saturation of the fields rather than the rain and that sufficient quantities of manure were present so that the run-off could not be classified as 'stormwater. '" 46) The reasoning from Concerned Area Residents for the Environment can easily be applied to stormwater discharges carrying heavy loads of sediment from forest road fills, at least on a case-by-case basis. Where sediment is present in the stormwater in such great amounts that the runoff can no longer be classified as "stormwater,"
then according to this analysis the conveyance by which the polluted water is delivered is no longer exempt from the definition of "point source."
United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc. is also instructive. The petitioners in that case operated a mushroom growing business which also produced mushroom compost for growing the mushrooms. On six different occasions, rainwater mixed with material from the compost tank, which then discharged through a separate drainage system into a creek. 47) The court reasoned that although mushroom growing is a type of farming, the production of the mushroom compost was an activity preliminary to farming rather than farming itself. In other words, the court considered the runoff from the compost to be separate from the agricultural process and therefore subject to discharge regulation. The court also considered the fact that the compost had a purpose independent of mushroom production (it was sold to other mushroom growers for profit) to be significant. 48) Likewise, the construction of forest roads can be argued to have a purpose independent of silvaculture--forest roads serve the nonsilvacultural function of providing public access to forest lands for recreation.
Although the term "agriculture" is not defined within the CWA, it is defined under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which like the CWA contains an exemption for certain activities relating to agriculture. |100| 환경법과 정책 제9권 (2012.11.30) including "farming in all its branches," including the "cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities ... and any practice performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations...
." 50) Under the FLSA, activities such do not fall under the definition of "primary agriculture" unless they are performed for the purpose of producing a specific agricultural or horticultural commodity. 51) Applying the same definition of "agricultural" to the construction of forest roads, it is easy to see that the construction of forest roads could not be considered "agriculture" because they are built not for the purpose of producing a specific agricultural product, but primarily to access a product that already exists and secondarily to provide public access to forest lands. " Road construction is not "cultivation and tillage of the soil," but rather falls under a class of operations which are merely preliminary, preparatory, However, one cannot ignore the fact that upholding the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Clean Water Act may result in significant negative effects on local and state governments as well as timber-related industries. This is perhaps the most compelling argument for reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision, though it does not relate to a strict and logical interpretation of the CWA. There are 386,000 miles of forest roads on federal lands alone, not to mention those contained on land owned by state and local governments (24% of the total forests in the U.S.). Obtaining an NPDES permit is a time-consuming process which can take up to five years. Because the "operator" of the industrial facility producing the pollutant is required to obtain the NPDES permit for each point source contained on his or her property, in most cases it would be the government owning the land that winds up bearing the cost of obtaining the permit. In other cases, it would be the operator of the logging facility. In addition to requiring years to complete, the process of obtaining a permit is an expensive one. This burden would inevitably be passed on to taxpayers, reduce public revenue from lumber operations, and discourage the construction of new roads, reducing public access to forest lands. Additionally, the increased costs for private operators would deliver a heavy blow to what is already an ailing industry, driving up the prices of logging-related products and forcing employers to slash jobs. 54) Should the new 53) "There are innumerable references in the legislative history to the effect that the Act is founded on the basic premise that a discharge of pollutants without a permit is unlawful and that discharges not in compliance with the limitations and conditions for a permit are unlawful. Even when infeasibility arguments were...raised, the legislature declined to abandon the permit requirement." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 , 1375 -76 (D.C.Cir.1977 Other major sectors such as paper were not as severely impacted as softwood lumber, but experienced declines in output, production value, and employment... Between 2005 and 2009, over 1.1 million jobs have been lost in six forestry, forest products, and related sectors of the U.S. economy. Three primary sectors in the forestry and forest products industries are forestry & logging (North American Industrial Classification System; NAICS 113), wood manufacturing (NAICS 332), and paper manufacturing (NAICS 321) which lost 14,631, 218,677, and 89,507 jobs, respectively, for a total of 322,805 primary sector jobs. Related sectors include furniture and related manufacturing (NAICS 337), residential construction (NAICS 3261), and furniture retail (NAICS 422) which lost 208,908, 388,725, and 138,065 jobs, respectively, for a total of 735,767 related sector jobs. These six sectors do not fully represent the scope of job losses associated with the U.S. forest sector, but provide a sense of the magnitude of the impact on the nation's forest industry and related work force. By comparison, employment in the transportation equipment manufacturing group (including automotive industry) declined by 25% over the same period (440,000 workers). 
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At the same time, one should consider that these projected costs are still speculative. Furthermore, even assuming that NAFO's projections are correct, one must also consider the cost to the environment of leaving timber operations poorly regulated. It will be up to the Supreme Court, and ultimately Congress, to balance these competing considerations when interpreting or revising the Clean Water Act. 투고일자 2012.10.26, 심사일자 2012.11.23, 게재확정일자 2012.11.26 57) The administrative costs for state agencies to run the regulatory programs would also cost millions of dollars per year in large states, and as much as $1 million per year in small states. 
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